Note: This is a deeper discourse into the method-definition section of the paper How To Fix The Government. Briefly, that paper defines a voluntary, democratic, fourth-estate organization, which uses a grid of districts to put forth one delegate each, to collectively function as a legislature. This legislative body is given the power to operate and propose within the organization's stated definition. The voluntary actions of members may follow along with these legislative acts. Here is a summary definition, and further details and considerations will be discussed to follow. Note: The definition for a "campaign" has been updated from its original.
Definition of Allowable Propositions:
1) Stated “Claims” of discrepancies between the actions of our government, and what we, the people, call moral, ethical, and just, including the evidence which supports the Claim;
2) stated “Campaigns”, or statements of areas and objectives for organized operations, for Redress deemed necessary to end specified Claims;
3) stated “Redress” serving specified Campaigns, to be carried out by member-volunteers, as led by elected Campaign leadership.
In the original paper, I had not gone into the details of interpreting the definition. There is the idea of an enforced definition, wherein the legislature is to confine its proposals. The other requirement is for a high percentage of support to pass. Once such a percentage is reached, as systems of government around the world go, the tendency is to take this as the highest power. A high percentage of the legislature is what our country uses to make amendments. The problem is to add an executive function that can block it. I don't think anyone should have the power to block a high percentage of the legislature, but perhaps it could be corralled into a format that allows all good proposals to pass. There is the matter of what statement of organizational purpose to the public is being promised and upheld.
To put this into perspective, a high percent of support alone could be enough of a check, in the name of the public trust. Once that number is reached, then so long as our legislature is representative, we really are generally in support of whatever the proposal is. What other considerations exist in relation to this?
I have imagined a small group of legislative representatives having to be checked by an executive function, on the legitimacy of their proposal. At an early point in the process, they may block a proposal from passing through to a general vote, until their requirements have been met.
I view executive branch functions as ways of being enforcers of the written rules. In this case, there is a promise to the public that this organization will operate within its written definition, and an executive check would back that promise. I have retained the fear that a legislative body could be a thing that conspires to produce what can be said to be a result of the body, but not necessarily of its individual members, or its constituents. It is as if they may all conspire to perform an isolated group function. I have wanted a promise to the public against a potentially lofty and wayward body. I should also note that within this total system, I do not imagine district representatives becoming too wayward in relation to the people who have elected them, and elected people are expected to vote on published ballots.
I have said that I think a high percentage of support in the legislature should not be blocked. The definition of what this organization does is what I would expect them to always be able to abide by. This definition could come in the form of requiring that a certain format be used, where the promise of the format is that it will not block good propositions. When having a written definition, it makes writing with the question of who has the power to enforce it.
I have wanted the judicial branch to be left over for reviewing whether or not members have violated the bylaws. I was not envisioning taking the legislature to court. As such, there would not be an assigned power as of yet to enforce the definition. The legislature itself could be held to the percentage of support required, and simply to say that they do what they do by their honor and in the public presence. Those who voted the legislators in will be able to see both the definition and their proposals.
Perhaps an executive who enforces the definition could be reviewed by the judicial for a bylaw violation in their enforcement. Where an executive check may also be overridden by the legislature, it may be desired that the executive has the last word on what they enforce, answerable only to their voters. There is another way to temper this executive function, and that is to expand it to a three-person panel instead of one, making it capable of overcoming one bad egg. The chair could be elected, and the other two seats could be filled rotationally by other elected executives.
Enforcing a Format
A format may be said to be enforced, with some elements that have to be present, such that no good proposition may be blocked by their requirements. I'll provide a list of items, for proposals of five types, which will include "self" as a type at the end. Imagine some of the writing you see here as what may become part of the written bylaws on amendments.
For All Amendment Types
It may be enforced that unique propositions are not bundled in with other propositions; they may each have to have their own passage, particularly when one is dependent upon the other. Replacing existing writing with new writing may include each of these parts at once.
It may be enforced that propositions do not conflict with the existing writing. It may be enforced that parts present are deemed relevant, and parts deemed relevant are not missing.
Districts may be granted the ability to make state or national proposals, and pass them. Multiple districts could amend the same writing this way. At this point, they would not be able to implement them outside of themselves. Enough district-level support for the same writing, such as 7.5% [a percentage] of districts nationally, may be given the power to force a national vote on the same amendment. Amending variations in the writing may also be conducted, where needed, to reach an exact match between jurisdictions.
For Bylaws
To amend the bylaws, a US-constitutional-amendment process may be used, where 3/4 of the districts each require 2/3 support for a national amendment. I would also propose that elected executives may vote, since they are part of the working infrastructure that is being amended. Each person gets an equal vote, whether they prefer to go to the legislature, or to the executive, which may be taken as a less restrictive left- or right-brained preference.
For Activist Propositions: Claims, Campaigns, and Redresses
The full national amendment process is not considered to be needed for activist propositions. The national body conducts the national propositions and votes, wherein a high percentage of support may be required, and I think the executives, of which there may be a small number, may wish to participate. I see room to consider increasing the requirements for campaigns, exclusively, to a greater amendment process.
At this point, individual states and districts could amend to opt out of writings which they have decided to not agree to and amend. This gives rise to the thought of creating a greater contract to begin with, where a full national amendment process is used to secure against any opposition with states or districts to follow.
For Claims
Claims of injustices should be the only basis for activism in this organization, which is to function from the standpoint of our conscious awareness, and it seems the only things that can be called out on this basis are violations of conscience and integrity. With a high percentage of support required, preferential propositions will not be well-positioned. The high percentages are for things we would more likely wish to take to court, and courts commonly use a high percentage of support, such as 100%, and to meet the terms "beyond a reasonable doubt" with its findings.
It may be commanded by the executive to run member polls, to get percentage of member support for specific statements, which can then be used to say whether or not a given claim is taken to be universally an injustice. To be within 1/10th percent support in a member poll, for example, could be enough to allow a statement of injustice to pass through to a full vote, but to be less could be blocked.
The evidence included to support a claim could be reviewed against rules of evidence, such as those applied by the government, at federal and state levels, and pieces of evidence could be blocked on this basis. Some supporting evidence is all that may be enforced to be required, but an executive could also ask for additional relevant evidence it is aware of to be added.
For Campaigns and Redresses
A campaign may state its area, such as a particular government sector or operation, and during its existence, it may amend objectives, or statements of what it wishes to achieve, beyond the implied universal objective, which is to end all claims in its area. These statements may be enforced to correspond, between the referenced claims and the area; between the area and the objectives; and between propositions for redress, and the area and objectives. It is expected that a campaign's area, objectives, and redress actions may be added onto over time.
When we move to campaigns, it seems to me to be possible to make proposals in two major directions. One is to end something that is happening, and the other is to do something that is not happening, where in either case, it backs itself with claims, and it says that it wishes to end the injustices.
We want the injustices to be gone, which means we can make further reparations of our own, or, for example, to grow our own food, because by way of an injustice, we don't have any. It doesn't fix the government to do it, but we get to have the food. Not having food is the injustice, which causes a claim of its cause. A claim could be closed if the cause is ended, but some of its bad effects could still be there, and they could still be called unjust.
When we begin by remaining in accordance with our interpretation of US laws, for campaigns and redress, it may be enforced that a proposition taken to be calling for breaking the law be treated as a bundled proposal, where a claim of an unjust law must first receive passage, such as to include having been deemed invalid, in order to then be presumed as such in another proposal. It may be written that a proposal of an invalid law be passed either by the legislature, or additionally, along with a confirming judicial review to complete that determination.
Campaigns and redresses involve two types of voting. The legislature votes on the respectability of the proposal, and not on whether or not they personally wish to participate in it. The individual members are the ones who vote their participation. We cannot allow the members of one campaign to provide enough support for a proposition of action to pass; we need majority support from the legislative body, for the universal respectability of a campaign's proposal. The legislature is not to block respectable proposals that serve existing campaigns; it is to block proposals that are offensive, not universal, and ultimately not respectable.
I think that when we get to how much support campaigns and redress require, I do not think it is necessarily the same as for claims. The claims provide the gateway to this process, as injustices on record, with clear majority support, I think of at least 2/3. Because of the percentage that may wish to act, perhaps the percentage of support for propositions of action to pass could be lower, such as at 3/5.
For redress, that the action services the specified campaign may be enforced, and whether or not the action is allowed could be the subject of an amended list of allowable actions. As such, the two independent universal lists of things which may exist and be amended over time would be rules of evidence and accepted types of actions, where an accepted type of action does not require a redress proposal. A campaign may also accumulate a list of stated objectives in its area over time.
For Self
This is a fifth category, but I felt it would be necessary for the organization as a whole to operate on its own behalf, as opposed to operating within and on behalf of one campaign. This would be propositions for Self, for promotion and survival. This would be through a special amendment process that works like claims, campaigns, and redresses, and not like bylaws, which would require a full national amendment process.
If there is allocation for self-promotion built into the annual budget, then it could be amended in the bylaws. If there is temporary allocation, it can be of a discretionary kind, and it can use the Self provision. I would propose the national body be able to use a possibly bylaw-regulated part of discretionary funds for self-promotion, or for the organization's self-defense, when needed.
Conclusion
The legislative body could be held by its honor to operate within this organization's written definition of itself. There is the proposition of an executive function of enforcing the definition against all legislative proposals. For the possibility of a wayward body, this does not present a conflict of interest; no one in the executive branch is a member of the writing or proposing body.
There is the possibility of expanding the executive function to one elected chair and two other (rotational) seats, to provide the ability to overcome one bad egg that way. There is the idea of overriding an executive block with a greater percentage of the legislature. Lastly, there is the idea of a standing legislative committee citing the executive for violating the bylaws in its definitional enforcement, which would bring the executive to judicial review.
This overall method and approach seems quite good to me, in its freedom from private ownership, its localization and distribution of power, and its universally appealing and inoffensive definition. The current public awareness of substantial government injustices also makes this approach appear to be capable of rallying for great success. With some discourse, I think a group could come to terms on how to handle the bylegal particulars, and proceed with confidence.
An item not included in this article... It could be held that on claims the proposal includes a statement of a more moral alternative to what the government has done. This seems helpful, in opposing the position that what the government has done was necessary. Can we agree that it was not a necessary act? Cheers.
Were can we chat to discuss this in more detail.